A hybrid system is a dynamical system whose behavior exhibits both discrete and continuous change. A hybrid automaton is a mathematical model for hybrid systems, which combines, in a single formalism, automaton transitions for capturing discrete change with differential equations for capturing continuous change. In this survey, we demonstrate symbolic algorithms for the verification of and controller synthesis for linear hybrid automata, a subclass of hybrid automata that can be analyzed automatically.
by computing with constraints over boolean variables that encode state sets. Because of its ability to deal with very large state spaces, symbolic model checking has been proven an effective technique for debugging of complex hardware [6] . For hybrid systems, the state space is infinite, so an enumerative approach is impossible, but the symbolic approach can be extended to a class of hybrid automata called linear hybrid automata by admitting linear constraints on continuous variables, namely, disjunctions of inequalities of the form Ax -c, where A is a constant matrix, c is a constant vector, and N E {I,>} is an inequality operator [4]. In a linear hybrid automaton, the dynamics of the continuous variables are defined by linear differential inequalities of the form AX -c, where X is the vector of first derivatives of the variables x.l Even though termination of the model checking procedure is not guaranteed-the model checking problem for linear hybrid automata is undecidable-the method is still of practical interest, because termination happens naturally in many examples and can be enforced in others, say, by considering the behavior of a system over a bounded interval of time. The procedure is implemented in the verifier HYTECH [9] .
Model checking can be used to provide more than a mere "yes" or "no" answer to the question of whether a system satisfies a correctness requirement. HYTECH provides also diagnostic information that aids in design and debugging. If a system fails to satisfy a correctness requirement, then HYTECH generates an error trajectory, which illustrates a time-stamped sequence of events that leads to a violation of the requirement. High-level system descriptions often use design parameters-symbolic constants with unknown, fixed values. The goal of parametric analysis is to determine necessary and sufficient constraints on the parameters under which safety violations cannot occur. HYTECH can perform such analysis for linear hybrid automata. Symbolic analysis methods can be applied to the problem of generating controller designs in addition to verifying existing designs [ll, 131. This approach provides a methodology to synthesize provably correct controllers, thereby avoiding the need for verification. The plant is modeled as a linear hybrid automaton whose ' It is important to realize that the definition of linearity for hybrid automata differs from the definition of linearity commonly used in systems theory. In particular, the differential inequalities of linear hybrid automata may not depend on the value of the variables, and thus dynamics of the form x = z are prohibited. mode-switches are partitioned into controllable and uncontrollable. Then, control for a given safety requirement can be formulated as a two-player game, which can be solved using a symbolic fixpoint computation procedure. This procedure, if it terminates, automatically generates a finite controller such that the closed loop system is correct with respect to the requirement.
The remaining paper consists of three sections. Section 2 presents the model of hybrid automata, Section 3 illustrates the analysis techniques, A simple pursuit game is used as a running example to demonstrate modeling, safety verification, parametric analysis, and controller synthesis. Section 4 gives pointers for further reading.
Linear Hybrid Automata

Example: a simple pursuit game
A linear hybrid automaton consists of a control graph with conditions on real-valued variables. Each node of the graph represents an operating mode of the system, and is annotated with differential inequalities that prescribe the possible evolutions (flows) of the real variables while the system remains in the given mode. Each node is also annotated with an invariant condition: while control of the linear hybrid automaton remains in a node, the variables must satisfy the node's invariant condition. Each edge of the graph represents a switch in operating mode, and is annotated with a condition that prescribes the possible changes (jumps) of the real variables when the system executes the given mode switch.
We use a simple two-person game of pursuit as a running example. There is a pursuer in a golf cart chasing an evader on a circular track 40 meters long. The cart can travel up to 6 meters per second in the clockwise direction, but only up to 1/2 meters per second going counterclockwise, since it must use its reverse gear to travel in this direction. The evader is on a bicycle, and travels at 5 meters per second in either direction. However, it makes a decision whether to change its direction only at fixed points in time, separated by exactly two 
Safety requirements
A safety requirement asserts that nothing bad will happen during the evolution of a system. Safety requirements can often be specified by describing the "unsafe" values and value combinations of the system variables. Then, the system satisfies the safety requirement iff all reachable states are safe. Safety verification, therefore, amounts to computing the set of reachable states.
For hybrid automata, we specify safety requirements using state assertions. A state assertion for the hybrid automaton A is a function that assigns to each control mode v E V a predicate cp(v) 
Safety verification of the pursuit game
We wish to verify that the evader's strategy is a winning strategy for the given initial position. The unsafe states are specified by the state assertion unsafe that assigns the predicate e = p to the control modes clockwise and counter. The computation of the reachable states starts from the state assertion
( c l o c k w i s e l e = 2 0 A p = l 0 A t = 2 ) , (counter, false), (rescued, false)}.
We compute the state assertion (PI = Post(cp0) in two steps. First, we find that all jump successors of (00-2We write {(cZockwise,pl), (counter,pz), (rescued,ps)} for the state assertion that assigns p l to the control mode clockwise, p 2 to counter, and p3 to rescued. Since Post(cp5) = cp5, we conclude that cp5 = reach. HYTECH performs these computations for us, fully automatically, and determines that no reachable state is unsafe.
Parametric analysis
In a linear hybrid automaton A, a design parameter a can be represented as a variable whose value never changes, i.e. all flow conditions must imply iu = 0 and all jump conditions must imply a' = a. Then, in all states of a trajectory of A, the parameter Q has the same value (but the value of a may differ from trajectory to trajectory). The value a E R is called safe for a if whenever we add the conjunct a = a to all initial conditions of A, then no unsafe state is reachable. This is t,he case precisely when there is no trajectory of A such that (1) the last state of the trajectory is unsafe., and ( 2 ) the parameter Q has the value a in the last state. Thus, the predicate 3X \ (a}.V,Ev(reach(w) A unsafe(w)) is a predicate over the variable a which is true precisely for the unsafe values for a. If reach and unsafe are linear state assertions, then the existential quantifier can be eliminated effectively, and we obtain, by negation, a linear predicate that characterizes exactly the safe values for the parameter a.
For the given evader strategy, we can use parametric analysis to determine the exact set of initial positions for the pursuer for which the evader can win the game. For this purpose, we introduce a parameter a to represent the initial position of the pursuer. 
Controller synthesis
To formulate the controller synthesis problem, we must first embellish our definition of linear hybrid automata to enable a means of control. We let the event set C of the automaton be partitioned into a set C, of controllable events and a set C, of uncontrollable events. Mode switches labeled with controllable events are called controllable; they can occur only when the controller designates. Mode switches labeled with uncontrollable events are called uncontrollable; they may occur whenever they are enabled. Intuitively a controller continually observes the state of the plant and chooses at any time to force a controllable mode switch to occur, provided it is enabled, or to let time pass. A controller for a linear hybrid automaton A is a function f from the states of A to Cc U {I}, where the symbol I represents a null control action. Let q = (w, a) and q' = (dl a') be two admissible states. The pair ( q , q ' ) is a controlled jump if f ( q ) = (T and there exists a control switch e E E with event label r~ E Cc that witnesses the jump ( q , q ' ) . The pair ( q , q ' ) is an uncontroZZabZe jump if there is a control switch with event label in Cu that witnesses the jump. The pair (q,q') is a controlled pow if it is a flow and f (w, a) = I for all ii on the straight line between the points a and a', excluding possibly a'. A controlled trajectory of a linear hybrid automaton A and the controller f is a finite sequence qo,q1 , .. . , q k of admissible states such that qo is initial and each pair of consecutive states is either a controlled jump, an uncontrollable jump, or a controlled flow.
Given a linear hybrid automaton A and a safety requirement unsafe, the controller synthesis problem is to find a controller such that there are no controlled trajectories for which the last state is an unsafe-state. Starting from the state assertion cpo = unsafe, we compute a state assertion 91 = Inevitable(cp0) for the states from which it is impossible for any controller to avoid The control strategy given for the evader in the pursuit example is non-optimal. Recall that from a starting position of 20, the evader wins iff the pursuer's initial position lies in the range (2,16). The linear hybrid automaton of Figure 3 is a model of the plant representing the evader's potential moves. The controllable events are go-clock for moving counterclockwise and go-counter for moving counterclockwise. The synthesis procedure generates a winning strategy for all starting positions of the pursuer other than those in the range [16, 20] . Intuitively, the strategy is to head for the helicopter in a clockwise direction unless either the pursuer can intercept the evader immediately or going continually counterclockwise will guarantee reaching the helicopter successfully. The evader however is not assured of reaching the helicopter. It may move back and forth along the track continually. For example, if the pursuer remains at position 30, then the evader must shuttle back and forth between positions 10 and 20; it may never progress to the helicopter itself, for fear that the pursuer will meet it just before, and it may never move to position 30, since the pursuer might be waiting there.
We illustrate the beginning of the synthesis procedure. Linear Approximations. While linear hybrid automata are expressive compared to other formalisms for which model checking is possible, such as finite automata and timed automata, many embedded applications do not meet the linearity constraints. In such cases, we have to conservatively approximate the system using linear hybrid automata so that if the approximate automaton satisfies a correctness requirement, then the original system satisfies the requirement as well. If, on the other hand, the approximate system violates the requirement, and the generated error trajectory is not a possible trajectory of the original system, then the approximation must be refined.
Divergence. To establish a liveness requirement, e.g, the evader will eventually reach the helicopter, we need to consider inJinite trajectories of the system. However, we wish to exclude unrealistic trajectories along which time does not diverge. For instance, for the evader automaton, we do not want to consider the trajectory in which the control stays at the node clockwise, with no jumps and infinitely many flows whose durations form a converging sequence. In controller synthesis, this issue arises even for safety requirements: we do not want a controller which would avoid the unsafe states by forcing infinitely many controlled switches within a finite duration of time. The interested reader should consult [13, 5] for treatment of the divergence problem.
